Introduction
The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions was established as a national trade union federation at its inau, gural conference in October 1987. It united, for the first time, the overwhelming majority of public and private sector unions (Wilson, 1991) . By 1989 public and private sector union membership had risen to 648,825 representing 63 percent of the fulltime workforce (Harbridge et al . . , 1994: 175-6) . Hence both in tettns of membership numbers and coverage as well as organisation and resources, the new federation was potentially the most powerful in New Zealand's labour history (Brosnan et al., 1990: 102, 124-25) .
While the membership and resources of thẽ NZCTU are considerable, throughout its short history the new federation has had to contend with an extremely difficult and hostile economic, industrial and political ẽnvironment. During the period from the election of the fourth Labour Government in 1984 until the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991, the NZCTU faced: high levels of unemployment; the decline of industries in which the traditionally more militant unions were based; a rise in business political activism and the emergence of industrial militancy amongst employers; a shift in the prevailing economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoclassicism and within industrial relations from pluralism to unitarism; and the implementation of a New Right policy agenda by Labour and National governments which is essentially pro-business and anti-worker. For accounts of the wider context of industrial relations in New Zealand see: Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Boston and Holland, 1990; Boston and Dalziel, 1992; Easton, 1989; Kelsey, 1995; Roper and Rudd, 1993; Roper, in press a, in press b; Rudd and Roper, in press. 258
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The National Party, Business Roundtable, Employers Federation, Treasury and new-· ......... _ economists deny that this policy agenda has mainly benefited a wealthy and powerful minority in New Zealand society. However, the overwhelming bulk of empirical data shows that the only group to have experienced a substantial rise in real disposable household income since 1984 is the top quintile. The majority of workers have experienced either a decline or, at least, no significant rise in real income, deterioration of their conditions of employment, and greater employment insecurity. In fact, it is undeniable that income and wealth has become much more unequally distributed since 1984.
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This situation raises some interesting questions because, despite the evident potential power of the NZCTU, and the fact that these policies have been clearly detrimental to the interests of the workers it represents, it consistently failed to successfully oppose and defeat any of the major policy initiatives of the fourth Labour Government or the succeeding National Government. In particular, during the period leading up to the passage of the ECA in May 1991 the NZCTU leadership failed to organise and lead the kind of generalised strike action that would, at the very least, have forced the National Government to substantially amend, if not withdraw, the legislation. In the industrial relations literature there have been remarkably few attempts to address the key questions which this raises: Why has the NZCTU leadership acted in such a conservative and timid manner in response to economic, social and industrial relations policies which have resulted in declining or stagnant real incomes, a deterioration of conditions of employment, and less employment security for the majority of the workforce? And, in particular, why did the NZCTU, despite the breadth and depth of working class opposition to the Employment Contracts Bill, completely fail to force the government to make any significant changes to the legislation?
Sound answers to these questions can be provided through systematic historical research guided and infottned by the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time union officials (also known as the rank and filist perspective). Of course, bureaucratic conservatism is not the only factor which must be considered when investigating the course of particular industrial disputes and therefore it is always important to analyse the wider historical context of a dispute. This includes the general state of the economy, prevailing balance of power between employers and workers, dominant economic orthodoxy, and policy agenda of the government. Hence explanatory accounts of the conservatism of the NZCTU leadership, if they are to be convincing, must combine theoretical analysis of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time trade union officials in the industrial relations systems of advanced capitalism with systematic historical research which disentangles the concrete interplay of economic, class, ideological and political forces specific to any particular dispute.
Th, e primary objective of this article is to highlight the relevance and potential fruitfulness of the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of trade union officials for the study of labour history and industrial relations in New Zealand. Specifically, the theory can be used 2
The growth of income inequality during the 1980s is widely established (Income Distribution Group, 1990; Department of Statistics, 1993 : ch.15, Depa1tntentofStatistics, Key Statistics, August 1994 :42-43 and December 1995 Economist, November 1994: 20; Kelsey, 1995: 256-59; Roper, in press b Anderson (1967) , Bramble (1993 ), CalliDicos (1995 , and Gluckstein (1986), and Richard Hy1nan (1971; 1975) in his early work. In , Bramble (1993) provides a highly sophisticated explication of the theory and this draws heavily on his work. S~nd, the article relies on the empirical research of ( 1994) . To sum up. Full-time trade union officials constitute a distinctive social stratum, with its own interests, in capitalist societies. Because of the bargaining functions that they perforn1 within the industrial relations system, and because of their conditions of work and isolation from the rank and file, union officials tend towards conservatism in industrial practice, particularly during large scale industrial disputes. It is important to recognise that the tendency towards bureaucratic conservatism within trade unions is precisely a tendency. There have been, and will continue to be, significant exceptions. Furthermore, bureaucratic conservatism is histo. rically contingent since union officials are subject to contradictory, conflicting and changing sets of social, economic and political pressures.
Criticisms of the theory of contingent bureaucratic conservatism
The theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time trade union officials, commonly referred to as the "rank and filist perspective", has been subject to extensive criticism (Heery and Fosh, 1990; Heery and Kelly, 1990; Hyman, 1989: ch.6; Kelly, 1988: ch.7; Zeitlin, 1987 Zeitlin, , 1989a Zeitlin, , 1989b . The critics have argued that: i) the , conservatism of fulltime union officials cannot be explained by reference to the specific nature of officials' working lives nor their involvem, ent in collective bargaining; ii) there is no clear divergence of interests between the trade union officialdom and the rank and file; iii) there is no clear dividing line within the organisational hierarchies of unions between the "officialdom" or "union bureaucracy" and the rank and file; iv) union officials are, contrary to the claims of rank and filists, actually responsive to the wishes of rank , and file members; and v) full-time officials do not necessarily tend to conservatism and rank and file members to militancy. In this section of the article these criticisms will themselves be subject to critical scrutiny. Kelly (1988) argues that the conservatism of full-time union officials cannot be explained by reference to the specific nature of officials' working lives which generally involve higher pay and· greater employment security than that experienced by union members, geographic and organisational isolation from rank and file members, and the power and prestigẽ associated with union leadership. In particular, the higher rate of pay that some officials get relative to the workers that they represent cannot be a factor explaining officials' conservatism since high paid workers can be industrially militant and low paid workẽrs quiescent (1988: 161-65) .
In response the more sophisticated rank and filists accept that there is no mechanical relationship between high or low wages and high or low rates of industrial militancy amongst sections of the workforce. Rather, they argue that, regardless of whether or not an official earns more than rank and file members, the overallẽffect of the officials' working conditions is to isolate him or her from those he or she represents (Bramble, 1993: 17-21 ) . As Callinicos observes:
Full-time officials are remov, ed from the discipline of the shop floor, from the dirt and dangers often found there, from the immediate . conflicts with the supervisor and manager, from the fellowship of their workmates, to the very different environment of an office. Even if they are not paid more than their members (and they usually are), their earnings no longer depend on the ups and downs of capitalist production ... If a plant is closed the official who negotiates the redundancies will not get the sack. Constantly closeted with management, full- Kelly, 1988:154-155; Zeitlin, 1989a: 49) . Rather being a clearly defined bureaucracy separate from a coherent and conscious rank in1ra-11nion relations are highly complex, with shifting interest groups and tendencies apparent at many levels. In this vein Hy1nan (1989: 158) has argued "the problem of 'bureaucracy' denotes not so much a distinct stratum of personnel as a which permeates the whole practice of trade unionism."
it is true that there is no simple and clear cut distinction between the rank and file ... "'&& officialdom. Unions have complex bureaucratic organisational which pass ordinary rank and file members, unpaid workplace delegates, elected regioaal members, regionally paid organisers, and full-time national officers. The problen1s involved in distinguishing between the union officialdom and the rank arise when one moves down the union hierarchy to regional organisers, elected unpaid office holders, and workplace delegates. If one must draw a "demarcation line" the rank and file and the union officialdom, then a key consideration is whether a is paid or unpaid, and if it is paid then by whom (in Britain some shop stewards are by their employer while working full-time on union business). As a general rule all fullpaid union officials form part of the union bureaucracy, although it is the case that the , like the rank and file, is heterogeneous.
the tendency to bureaucratic conservatism grows stronger as one moves up the bierarchy (although, obvious-y, there are some exceptions). For example, regional are likely to be more responsive to rank and file demands than national officers. , regioaal organisers are typically bureaucratically appointed and are dependent for positions on the continued patronage of the national leadership. This article is primarily with the conse1 vatism of the NZCTU leadership, and there can be no doubt that bers of the NZCTU's Natioaal Executive, and other full-time paid national office who are in Wellington, are "union bureaucrats" in the classical sense.
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The rank and filists argue that, despite the organisational complexity of some unions, and existence of other sources of intra-union conflict, there is still a discernible divergence interests between the working-class membership of trade unions and full-time office officials (Bramble, 1993: 17) . This divergence of interests arises because the driving force of economic activity in capitalist society is, given the competitive war which is waged on both commodity and capital markets, the necessity of firms to re•na;n profitable. Profit in capitalist society is the principal, but not the only, phenomenal form assumed by surplus-value. Surplus-value is the monetary form of the social surplus product specific to a capitalist society. In other words, workers produce a surplus product over and above their own subsistence needs, and the exchange-value of this surplus product is equivalent to surplusvalue. The surplus-value produced by workers in capitalist production is appropriated by capitalists by virtue of their exclusive ownership (in the sense of effective control) of the means of production. Hence the divergence of interests between rank and file union members and union officials arises because "the task of trade unions ... is to defend workers' interests within capitalist relations of production, within the wages system. The unions exist to improve the tetiits on which the worker is exploited, not to put an end to exploitation." (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986: 26) Agreements reached between unions and employers through collective bargaining within capitalism, even where such agreements involve substantial improvements in wages and conditions, only have a marginal impact on the overall process of surplus-extraction. The interests of union officials are inextricably linked to the continued maintenance of legislation codifying agreements reached through collective negotiation of the buying and selling of labour power, which in tum depends upon the continued subordination and exploitation of workers within the production process. In short, collective agreements may be reached with employers which do reflect, to a limited and partial extent, workers' desire for higher wages and better conditions of employment. But such agreements can never more than partially realise workers' interests because they have fundamental interests (inter alia securing the "full fruits of their labour", distributing this according to need rather tban profit, and democratic workplace control) which are essentially anti-capitalist.
Zeitlin argues that the rank and filist perspective is inadequate because there is "pervasive evidence" that full-time officials actually are responsive to the wishes of rank and file members, with the result that it has been possible "to keep internal tensions within tolerable bounds" (1989a: 58-9). This criticism has some force against simplified versions of the rank and filist perspective, but not against those which recognise that the conservatism of officials is contingent because they are subject to contradictory and conflicting social forces, the relative weight of which can change rapidly over time. In unions with a high degree of internal democracy and rank and file participation in union affairs, or during industrial disputes where the rank and file is placing considerable pressure on their officials to act, the officials may be responsive to rank and file demands. But the weight of historical evidence suggests that during large scale industrial disputes union officials tend to adopt a more conservative posture than the rank and file (see for example, Bramble, 1993; Callincos, 1995; Callinicos and Simons, 1985; Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986; Harman, 1988; Moody, 1988; Kerry, 1980; Robertson, 1988 
Finally, the rank and filist perspective has been criticised for focusing excessively on internal conflict within unions and failing to place sufficient weight on the frequently hostile external social, economic and political context in which unions have to operate. Once again this criticism is wide of the mark. Rank and filists r· eadily acknowledge that when considering any specific dispute, particularly where the union has lost, it is important not to focus exclusively on the role of the union officials. It is necessary to place the dispute within a wider societal and historical context (see for example, Roper, 1990) .
Relevance of the theory? Explaining the timidity and conservatism of the NZCTU leadership
As mentioned earlier, from the outset the NZCTU faced the hostility of employers who had been growing increasingly industrially militant and politically active throughout the 1980s and Labour and National governments intent on ramming through a comprehensive programme of ' New Right economic, social and industrial r· elations policy reforn1 which was clearly detrimental to the interests of workers (Roper, 1993: 160-62; Walsh, 1993: 184-89) . In response to these attacks, the NZCTU leadership continually emphasised the need for negotiation and compromise with both employers and government, while demonstrating a complete disdain for industrial action and political protest. It is the central contention of this articl· e that the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of the union officialdom both explains, and is empirically corroborated by, the largely timid, passive, conciliatory, and conservative response of the NZCTU leadership to the succession of attacks on its members by the fourth Labour Government and following National Government. While it is not possible to provide a detailed empirically grounded account of the perfortnance of the NZCTU leadership from 1987 to the present, it is possible to make a number of general observations. First, the theory of bureaucratic conservatism emphasises that the union bureaucracy is a distinct social stratum with its own interests which is, particularly in the upper echelons of the union federation, subject to minimal rank and file control over its activities. This is clearly the case with the NZCTU leadership. Even in tettns of its fortnal structure the democratic accountability of the NZCTU leadership to its rank and file members is minimal. Unlike the FOL which held annual confer· ences, the NZCTU only holds conferences on a biennial basis. The President, Vice President and Secretaryrfreasurer ar· e only subJect to election once every four years (less frequently than the Prime Minister!), there is no effective constitutional mechanism enabling rank and file members of affiliated unions to remove the President or Vice President from office for inadequate perfortnance, there is no constitutional requirement for union officials to vote in accord with the wishes of the majority of their members in special meetings of affiliates, nor is there any constitutional requirement that affiliated unions be internally democratic (NZCTU, 1994: 49-73) . In short, effective democracy is virtually non-existent within the NZCTU's organizational structure.
The full significance of the lack of d· emocracy within the NZCTU becomẽs clear when it is recognised that the majority of rank and file members failed to support the leadership's two major "strategic responses" to attacks by Labour and National governments between 1987 and 1991. In response to the economic restructuring and public sector refortn of the fourth • was promoted as a "third way" between the heavy handed intervention of aal the line monetaris•n of "Roge1nomics". The key problem for the to persuade the Labour Oove1nment to adopt the strategy was that its "lack over illdividual tmions and its keenness to quell 1Jnion miJitancy meant that aDd could justifiably discount the of tmion opposition to reforan, the IMJCd for a gen11inely corporatist framework (Bray and Neilson, 1996: 79 (Bray and Neilson, 1996: 79 (1995) and Bramble and Heal (in press) have showa:
The CTU' s formal and institutional alliance with Labour left it unable to criticise Labour when it privatised government agencies and deregulated industries. In tum, by failiDg to keep faith with its membership and by failing to promote their interests within their party, the CTU became estranged from its membership and allies and thus weakened. A large number of the public looked to the CTU for leadership and heard nothing (Dannin, 199S: 39) .
Even after the election of a National Government clearly committed to sweeping attacks the bade union movement, the NZCTU response was to seek negotiation and According to Robyn Haultain, a for·rtter CTU counsel:
There was a lot of internal discussion [within the NZCTU] about whether we should start meeting with Bill Birch, from the National Party, and with people who we knew were going to be at the forefront of the charge as far as voluntary unionisn1 and so on wu concerned.
All of the people who worked in the technical services division had a very sbong opinion that we ought to be meeting with Birch and as many other National Party people u we could (interview cited by Dannin, 1995: 40)0 While these meetings did not eventuate, the fact that they were seriously considered at this crucial juncture highlights the "negotiate and compromise" ethos of the NZCTU.
From the outset it was widely recognised that the central provisions of the Employment Contracts Bill would fundamentally underrnine union membership and coverage, · collective action and bargaining power.
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The bill was introduced in conjuuction significant reductions in benefit rates and the introduction of much harsher eligibility ._... (Boston and Dalziel, 1992) . In particular, a six month stand down period was 1br the unemployment benefit for workers who left their jobs "without a good and reason" or lost their job through "misconduct" (Stephens, 1992: 109) . Workers action were also ruled to be ineligible for the unemployment benefit. Early ia 199 popularity of National, as reflected in opinion polls, declined to an historic low governing party. The implementation of the New Right policy agenda from 1984 with the resulting substantial upward redistribution of income and the "dowa 4
In the event, total union membership declined from 603, 118 in May 1991 to 362, 200 Ia with a decline in union density (full-time equivalent union memben to the total percent to 210 7 percent (Crawford, et al., 1996: 188; Harbridge, 1993 legislation. This conference decision effectively meant that the union movement had an historic opportunity to at least slow down the continued implementation of the policy agenda. It also constituted a travesty of the most elementary principles of Officials block voted against the proposal for a general strike despite the fact that they had no mandate from their rank and file members_ to do so. Indeed, the majority of rank and file members in these unions would have endorsed and supported such action.
The arguments that have been made in defence of the role played by the NZCI'U in tbe struggle against the ECA are not convincing. First, leading figures in the NZCI'U that there was insufficient rank and file support for a general strike, that if a seaeral strike had been called it would have been unsuccessful and merely highlighted the of the unions. While it must be acknowledged that there is insufficient evidence to CODCJua.
ively prove that a majority of rank and file union members supported a ge•,mral ~ is far less, if any, evidence to suggest that a majority actually opposed strike Easton (1995) among others, argues that a general m~ite would not have government to withdraw or amend the legislation. It is true that a 24 hour gaae1ld its own would not have been sufficient to force the gove1nment to amend the a successful general strike would have raised workers' confidence aad C011kl followed by further generalised strike action and mass protests. Jivea depth of popular opposition to the government at the time, and the mass support for the initial general strike, it is possible that key of have decided to stay out longer than 24 hours without direction from face of such opposition it is likely that the government would have, at the • t the legislation in order to defuse the situation (it was subsequeotly of its initiatives in superannuation and health).
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